Objection Deadline: January 6, 2010 at 4:00 p.m. (Prevailing Eastern Time) Hearing Date and Time: January 13, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. (Prevailing Eastern Time)

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Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In re : Chapter 11 Case No.

• 00 12555 (TMD)

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et al., : 08-13555 (JMP)

:

Debtors. : (Jointly Administered)

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NOTICE OF DEBTORS' MOTION TO STRIKE WILLIAM KUNTZ'S NOTICE OF APPEAL OF ORDER DENYING RELIEF UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS WILLIAM KUNTZ'S APPEAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing on the annexed Motion of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("<u>LBHI</u>") and its affiliated debtors in the above-referenced chapter 11 cases (together, the "<u>Debtors</u>") to strike from the record of these cases William Kuntz, III's ("<u>Kuntz</u>") notice of appeal of the order of this Court, entered on September 17, 2009, denying Kuntz's motion to modify or vacate the Court's earlier order denying Kuntz's motion for relief from the automatic stay [Docket No. 5215] (the "<u>Order</u>") or, in the alternative, to dismiss Kuntz's appeal of the Order, all as more fully described in the Motion, will be held before the Honorable James M. Peck, United States Bankruptcy Judge, at the United States Bankruptcy Court, Alexander Hamilton Customs House, Courtroom 601, One Bowling Green, New York, New York 10004 (the "<u>Bankruptcy Court</u>"), on **January 13, 2010 at 10:00 a.m.** (**Prevailing Eastern Time**) (the "<u>Hearing</u>").

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that objections, if any, to the Motion shall be in writing, shall conform to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules") and the Local Rules of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, shall set forth the name of the objecting party, the basis for the objection and the specific grounds thereof, shall be filed with the Bankruptcy Court electronically in accordance with General Order M-242 (which can be found at www.nysb.uscourts.gov) by registered users of the Bankruptcy Court's case filing system and by all other parties in interest, on a 3.5 inch disk, preferably in Portable Document Format (PDF), WordPerfect, or any other Windows-based word processing format (with two hard copies delivered directly to Chambers), and shall be served upon: (i) the chambers of the Honorable James M. Peck, One Bowling Green, New York, New York 10004,

Courtroom 601; (ii) Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10153, Attn: Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., attorneys for the Debtors; (iii) the Office of the United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York (the "<u>U.S. Trustee</u>"), 33 Whitehall Street, 21st Floor, New York, New York 10004 Attn: Andy Velez-Rivera, Esq., Paul Schwartzberg, Esq., Brian Masumoto, Esq., Linda Riffkin, Esq., and Tracy Hope Davis, Esq.; and (iv) Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York 10005, Attn: Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Dennis O'Donnell, Esq., and Evan Fleck, Esq., attorneys for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed in these cases, so as to be so filed and received by no later than **January 6, 2010 at 4:00 p.m.** (**prevailing Eastern Time**) (the "<u>Objection</u> Deadline").

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that if an objection to the Motion is not received by the Objection Deadline, the relief requested shall be deemed unopposed, and the Bankruptcy Court may enter an order granting the relief sought without a hearing.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that objecting parties are required to attend the Hearing, and failure to appear may result in relief being granted or denied upon default.

Dated: December 17, 2009 New York, New York

/s/ Shai Y. Waisman

Shai Y. Waisman

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Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In re : Chapter 11 Case No.

:

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et al., : 08-13555 (JMP)

•

Debtors. : (Jointly Administered)

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DEBTORS' MOTION TO STRIKE WILLIAM KUNTZ'S NOTICE OF APPEAL OF ORDER DENYING RELIEF UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS WILLIAM KUNTZ'S APPEAL

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES M. PECK UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("<u>LBHI</u>") and its affiliated debtors in the above-referenced chapter 11 cases, as debtors in possession, (together, the "<u>Debtors</u>"), respectfully submit this motion (the "<u>Motion</u>") to strike from the record of these cases William Kuntz, III's ("<u>Kuntz</u>") notice of appeal (the "<u>Notice of Appeal</u>") of an order of this Court, entered on September 17, 2009, denying Kuntz's motion to modify or vacate the Court's earlier order denying Kuntz's motion for relief from the automatic stay [Docket No. 5215] (the "<u>Order</u>") or, in the alternative, to dismiss Kuntz's appeal of the Order (the "<u>Appeal</u>"), from the record of these cases and respectfully represent:

Preliminary Statement

- 1. Kuntz, who is no stranger to this Court or the court system in general, appeared just three days into these cases, not as a concerned creditor genuinely asserting his rights in accordance with the procedures of this Court and the laws and rules governing these cases but, rather, as an individual lacking respect for such procedures and the resources of this Court and the Debtors' estates. Once again, and in accordance with his past practices, Kuntz has ignored the procedures of this Court by untimely filing the Notice of Appeal of the Order to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "District Court"), forcing the Debtors to expend their resources responding and taking up more of this Court's valuable time.
- 2. While filing a notice of appeal ordinarily divests this Court of jurisdiction and transfers the issue being appealed to the District Court, one significant exception to that general rule is when, as here, the notice of appeal is not timely filed. Under such circumstances, the Court has authority to consider and rule upon a motion to strike the notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Debtors respectfully request that the Court strike the Notice of Appeal from the record of these cases. In the alternative, should this Court decline to strike the Notice of Appeal, then the Debtors respectfully request that the Court dismiss the Appeal for the same reasons set forth herein.
- 3. Although Kuntz is a *pro se* litigant, under well-established law, he must adhere to all rules of procedure, including with respect to the timely filing of appeals. Because Rule 8002(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules") is jurisdictional, Kuntz's failure to follow the applicable statutory procedures is fatal to the validity of his appeal of the Order. Moreover, although Kuntz filed a motion pursuant to Bankruptcy

Rule 8002(c) seeking to extend the time in which to file a notice of appeal earlier in these cases (with respect to a different order of this Court), he failed to do so here and his untimely Notice of Appeal may not serve as such a motion. Accordingly, the Notice of Appeal should be stricken from the record of these cases or, alternatively, the Appeal should be dismissed.

Background

- 4. Commencing on September 15, 2008 and periodically thereafter (as applicable, the "Commencement Date"), LBHI and certain of its subsidiaries commenced with this Court voluntary cases under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"). The Debtors' chapter 11 cases have been consolidated for procedural purposes only and are being jointly administered pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b). The Debtors are authorized to operate their businesses and manage their properties as debtors in possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.
- 5. On September 17, 2008, the United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York (the "<u>U.S. Trustee</u>") appointed the statutory committee of unsecured creditors pursuant to section 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Creditors' Committee").
- 6. On October 24, 2008, Kuntz filed a motion (the "60(b) Motion") [Docket No. 1261] for relief from an order of this Court, entered on October 16, 2008 (the "Order Denying Stay Relief") [Docket No. 1094], denying Kuntz's earlier motion for relief from stay, dated September 18, 2008 [Docket No. 271].
- 7. On October 24, 2008, Kuntz also filed with this Court a motion to extend the time to appeal the Order Denying Stay Relief (the "Motion to Extend") [Docket No. 1260]. The Motion to Extend did not set a hearing date, as required by the Order Implementing Certain Notice and Case Management Procedures [Docket No. 285] (as applicable, the "Case

<u>Management Order</u>"), ¹ and Kuntz, not surprisingly, never prosecuted the Motion to Extend. This Court has not ruled on the Motion to Extend.

- 8. Although the Court had not ruled on the Motion to Extend and the Rule 60(b) Motion was still pending, on November 13, 2008, Kuntz filed a notice of appeal of the Order Denying Stay Relief to the District Court [Docket No. 1502]. Again disregarding procedural rules, Kuntz filed the statement of issues on appeal and designation of items to be included in the record on appeal late (the "Statement of Issues and Designation I"). Kuntz's notice of appeal of the Order Denying Stay Relief is dated November 13, 2008, which required Kuntz to file the Statement of Issues and Designation I on or before November 24, 2008. *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006 (requiring designation of items to be included in record on appeal within 10 days of filing notice of appeal). Kuntz filed his Statement of Issues and Designation on December 1, 2008, seven days late.
- 9. At the initial pre-trial conference on February 19, 2009, the District Court dismissed Kuntz's appeal of the Order Denying Stay Relief, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction because the 60(b) Motion was still pending before this Court although Kuntz had not yet scheduled it for hearing by this Court (again in violation of the Case Management Order). *See* Tr. of Feb. 19, 2009 Pre Trial Conference, at 5:2 11, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
- 10. On March 5, 2009, Kuntz filed an affidavit in Support of the 60(b) Motion [Docket No. 3028].
- 11. On March 10, 2009, subsequent to the District Court's dismissal of the appeal of the Order Denying Setoff, Kuntz scheduled the 60(b) Motion to be heard six months out in September 2009. *See* Docket No. 3028, at 2.

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¹ The Case Management Order was amended by the Amended Order Implementing Certain Notice and Case Management Procedures, dated February 13, 2009 [Docket No. 2837].

- 12. The Debtors filed an objection to the 60(b) Motion on September 10, 2009 (the "Objection") [Docket No. 5093]. On September 12, 2009, Kuntz filed a reply to the Objection [Docket No. 5180].
- 13. At a hearing to consider the 60(b) Motion on September 15, 2009 (the "Hearing"), the Court denied the 60(b) because Kuntz failed to show cause for relief from the Order Denying Stay Relief. *See* Tr. of Hearing, at 124:12 24, attached hereto as Exhibit B. On September 17, 2009, the Court entered the Order denying the 60(b) for the reasons stated on the record at the Hearing [Docket No. 5215].

Kuntz's Procedurally Improper Attempts to Appeal the Order

- 14. On September 29, 2009 eleven days after the entry of the Order Kuntz filed the Notice of Appeal [Docket No. 5307] seeking to appeal the Order. Accordingly, the appeal was untimely under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a). *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) ("The notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.").
- 15. On November 16, 2009 over thirty days after filing the Notice of Appeal Kuntz filed his statement of issues on appeal and designation of items to be included in the record on appeal (the "Statement of Issues and Designation II") [Docket No. 5854]. Bankruptcy Rule 8006 requires that an appellant file a designation of the items to be included in the record on appeal and a statement of the issues to be presented within 10 days of filing the notice of appeal. *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006. Thus, Kuntz's Statement of Issues and Designation II was also untimely filed.

16. On November 24, 2009, out of an abundance of caution, the Debtors filed their statement of issues and counter-designation of additional items to be included in the record on appeal in response to Kuntz's Statement of Issues and Designation II [Docket No. 5946].

Jurisdiction

- 17. This Court has jurisdiction to consider this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1408 and 1409.
- 18. Although ordinarily the filing of a notice of appeal deprives a bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to proceed with matters related to such appeal, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(a), where, as here, a notice of appeal is *untimely* filed, the bankruptcy court properly may adjudicate a motion to strike the notice of appeal or, in the alternative, dismiss the untimely appeal. See, e.g., Williams v. EMC Mortgage Corp. (In re Williams), 216 F.3d 1295, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's affirmance of bankruptcy court's dismissal of appeal for untimeliness); Stepflug v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 790 F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1986) (bankruptcy court granted appellee's motion to dismiss untimely appeal and district court affirmed; court of appeals ultimately reversed on grounds other than the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to decide motion to dismiss); Gravel & Shea v. Vt. Nat'l Bank, 162 B.R. 969, 972 n.2 (D. Vt. 1993) (noting that "the Bankruptcy Court could consider the timeliness of [a] notice of appeal in the context of a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed," but because the question of timeliness of the notice had not been presented to the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court must determine whether to dismiss the appeal as untimely); In re Bushnell, 273 B.R. 359, 360 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss untimely appeal); Beiwel v. Sallie Mae Servicing (In re Beiwel), No. 00-00112-W, 2001 WL 753778, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa June 12,

2001) (granting motion to dismiss untimely *pro se* appeal). Thus, as discussed more fully below, because Kuntz's Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the Motion and strike the Notice of Appeal.

The Notice of Appeal Should be Stricken from the Record

- I. Kuntz's Failure to Timely File a Notice of Appeal Precludes Appellate Review
- 19. Kuntz's appeal of the Order is invalid and precludes review by the District Court. The timely filing of an appeal of a bankruptcy court's order is essential to the validity of the appeal. Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) provides:
 - (a) Appeal as of Right; How Taken. An appeal from a judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy judge to a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel . . . shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk within the time allowed by Rule 8002. An appellant's failure to take any step other than timely filing the notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.
- Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(a). The statutory language clearly provides that an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order is valid only if the notice of appeal is filed within the ten-day time period set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 8002. *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). As the Notice of Appeal was filed outside the ten-day period, the Appeal is invalid.
- 20. Significantly, the ten-day period is strictly construed, and courts require strict compliance with its terms. *Twins Roller Corp. v. Roxy Roller Rink Joint Venture*, 70 B.R. 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); *Stephen Rose & Partners, Ltd. v. Togut, Segal & Segal (In re Satellite Sys. Corp.*), 73 B.R. 610, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Further, Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) is jurisdictional, such that "[f]ailure to file a timely notice of appeal thus deprives the district court of jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court's order or judgment." *Twins Roller Corp.*, 70 B.R.

at 310 (collecting cases); accord Peryea v. Town of Plattsburgh (In re Peryea), No. 96-5041, 1997 WL 50015, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 1997); Montco, Inc. v. Barr (In re Emergency Beacon Corp.), 666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1981); Joslin v. Wechsler (In re Wechsler), 246 B.R. 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Satellite Sys. Corp., 73 B.R. at 611; French Bourekas, Inc. v. Turner, 199 B.R. 807, 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The failure to file a notice of appeal within the ten-day period is a jurisdictional defect, which requires dismissal of the appeal."); In re Bushnell, 273 B.R. at 362-63 (collecting cases supporting the "well settled" principle that "the filing requirements of [Bankruptcy] Rule 8002 are jurisdictional and failure to timely file a notice of appeal precludes appellate review."). Thus, the District Court is without jurisdiction to review the Order.

Drain granted the reorganized debtors' motion to dismiss an appeal of this Court's order that was filed by a *pro se* litigant one day after the expiration of the statutory period for filing a notice of appeal. Case no. 03-41710 (RDD), Order at 2-3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2009), attached hereto as Exhibit C. Judge Drain did not issue a written opinion regarding the reorganized debtors' motion to dismiss the untimely appeal. However, while ruling from the bench, Judge Drain addressed the jurisdictional issue and found the following:

Generally speaking, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction over matters covered by the appeal. However, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory in jurisdiction. If the notice is not timely filed, the Appellate Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal

More specifically, this issue has been addressed by, at least, one court directly. Where the court found that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to consider the timeliness of the notice of appeal as this ruling said. The notice of appeal from the final order generally deprives a lower court over [sic] jurisdiction over the merits of the matter subject to appeal. However, the Bankruptcy Court retains certain authority concerning the timeliness of the appeal. Including, for example, the authority to extend the

period of time for filing a notice of appeal, pursuant to Rule $8002(c)\dots$

So I believe that it is appropriate for me to decide this issue.

See Tr. of June 16, 2009 Hr'g at 11:21 – 12:16, case no. 03-41710 (RDD), attached hereto as Exhibit D. Judge Drain's bench-ruling is consistent with the statutory language of Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) and related case law. See Fed. R. Bank. P. 8001(a).

22. In this case, the Order was entered on the Court's docket on September 17, 2009. Therefore, the ten-day period in which to file a notice of appeal of the Order expired on September 28, 2009. *See* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). Kuntz filed his Notice of Appeal on September 29, 2009, a day after the expiration of the statutory period for filing a notice of appeal of the Order. Accordingly, the Appeal is not valid and the District Court is precluded from reviewing the Order. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal should be stricken from the record of these cases or, alternatively, the Appeal should be dismissed.

II. The Court Should Give No Weight to Kuntz's Pro Se Status

23. The fact that Kuntz is appearing *pro se* does not compel a different result. It is well-settled that *pro se* litigants must adhere to all rules of procedure, and, a lack of knowledge of such rules, although Kuntz could not prove one here, is not a defense. *See Green v. Dorrell*, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992) (dismissal of complaint appropriate where *pro se* plaintiff failed to comply with local rules). Many Circuit Courts, including the Second Circuit, have recognized that "*pro se* litigants are not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court imposed deadlines." *Jones v. Phipps*, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1994); *accord LoSacco v. City of Middletown*, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995). This rule applies with equal strength in the context of the timeliness of the filing of an appeal. *See*, *e.g.*, *Campos v. LeFevre*, 825 F.2d 671, 675 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting a strict position with respect to the

timeliness of pro se appellant's appeal, notwithstanding that such rule may be "Draconian," especially "[a]s we deal more and more frequently with pro se appeals and laymen unfamiliar with the intricacies of federal civil procedure, let alone the rules of appellate practice"); accord Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 368 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (adopting stringent rule with respect to appeals despite recognition that it may lead to "harsh results" for pro se litigants); In re Furst, 206 B.R. 979, 981 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997) (holding that pro se appellant was not relieved of its responsibility to follow rules setting out the deadline for filing a notice of appeal, as it is the risk the party assumes when it opts to proceed pro se); In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 466 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (dismissing a number of untimely appeals, including several pro se appeals, and citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), for proposition that "although a person proceeding pro se may not fully understand the rules or procedure, he or she is still required to comply with the rules. . . . [A] pro se status does not exempt a person from complying with the rules."); In re Beiwel, 2001 WL 753778, at *3 (dismissing appeal of pro se appellant who "was solely in control of the time for filing his notice of appeal and was not mislead or misinformed at any stage. It was his duty to inform himself of the appeal deadline . . . ").

24. Moreover, as this Court well knows, Kuntz is no ordinary *pro se* litigant. The Debtors again direct the Court to a decision issued by the District Court over 16 years ago, in which the District Court found that

Kuntz's status as a *pro se* litigant is of little import. During his fourteen-year participation in the underlying Grant bankruptcy proceedings, Kuntz has amassed litigation experience that would embarrass the majority of associates, and some partners, at large New York law firms. He has already filed no fewer than eight appeals, all unsuccessful, with six dismissed as either untimely or for failure to prosecute. I had to adjourn one conference in this action because Kuntz had an argument before the Second

Circuit. Although I am unsure what significance to give to the ten years that Kuntz purportedly spent in law school, I find that his failure to comply with court rules, procedures, and deadlines is the result of conscious disregard, and not because of unfamiliarity with the courts. Throughout the proceedings, Kuntz has demonstrated a consistent pattern of vexatious litigation and little respect for the courts or other parties. The acts required of Kuntz were within his complete control and there was no acceptable reason for the delay.

Kuntz v. Pardo, 160 B.R. 35, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The court further stated that

Kuntz's dilatory conduct throughout his participation in the Grant case evinces bad faith. Apart from the lack of merit to his appeals, he has repeatedly failed to abide by the rules of the court and repeatedly fails to prosecute the appeals that he has filed. By contrast to cases holding that a party should not be penalized without considering the relative culpability of the appellant and his or her attorney, Kuntz has elected to appear *pro se* and thus the culpability is all his. There is no injustice manifest in allowing Kuntz to bear the brunt of his own neglect.

Kuntz v. Pardo, 160 B.R. at 39 (internal citations omitted). See also In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. et al., Case No. 06-10977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2007) (Mem. Decision Denying Mot. of William Kuntz III For An Order Reinstating His Proof of Claim, at 6) [Docket No. 877], aff'd, Case No. 07-7698 (DAB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) [Docket No. 9] (finding that Kuntz's "extensive legal experience, unlike many other pro se litigants, invokes little sympathy from this Court "); In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc., 238 B.R. 479, 484 n.7 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1999) (noting that Kuntz has considerable experience with federal law and his pro se status is not something the court considered relevant). In light of the foregoing, the Motion should be

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² The court in *Commercial Financial* listed some of the published and unpublished decisions that Kuntz has been an active party:

Kuntz v. DASU LLC, (In re Cray Computer Corp.), 145 F.3d 1345 (Table) (10th Cir. 1998); Kuntz v. Cray Computer Corp. (In re Cray Computer Corp.), 107 F.3d 880 (Table) (10th Cir. 1997); Kuntz v. Grand Union Co. (In re Grand Union Co.), 106 F.3d 385 (Table) (3d Cir. 1996); Kuntz v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, 200 B.R. 101 (D. Del. 1996) (Kuntz sanctioned for pursuing a frivolous appeal, notwithstanding his pro se

granted and the untimely Notice of Appeal should be stricken from the record of these cases or, in the alternative, the Appeal should be dismissed.

status, because of Kuntz's extensive appellate experience – listing failed federal and state appeals); *Kuntz v. Cray Computer Corp.* (*In re Cray Computer Corp.*), 97 F.3d 1464 (Table) (10th Cir. 1996); *Kuntz v. Nova Vista Industries, Inc.* (*In re Nova Vista Industries, Inc.*), 1992 WL 60395 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); *In re Adirondack Railway*, 1990 WL 124225 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); *Ehre v. State of New York* (*In re Adirondack Railway*), 93 B.R. 867 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); *In re W.T. Grant Co.*, 85 B.R. 250 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), *aff'd in part, reversed in part*, 119 B.R. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denial of Kuntz's request for fees and expenses); *In re One Westminister Co.*, 74 B.R. 37 (D. Del. 1987); *In re W.T. Grant Co.*, 4 B.R. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).

Kuntz brought an action in connection with the fate of The Peter Kuntz Company, a company apparently founded by his grandfather, against six banks, an investment firm, and John and Jane Does 1-299, alleging a conspiracy to dismantle the company. *See Kuntz v. Shawmut Bank of Boston*, 1987 WL 11172 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

Kuntz also sued the New York State Senate, the New York State Board of Elections, various individuals, and numerous John and Jane Does, claiming constitutional violations in connection with Kuntz's attempt to run as an independent candidate for the United States House of Representatives in 1992. *See Kuntz v. New York State Board of Elections*, 924 F. Supp. 364 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); *Kuntz v. New York State Senate*, 113 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 1997).

Kuntz has filed complaints against the New York Stock Exchange (motion for leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 877 (1998)); the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, *see* 1997 WL 150062 (D.C. Cir. 1997); the City of Dayton, Ohio, see 99 F.3d 1139 (Table) (6th Cir. 1996); the Department of Energy (1995); and the United States Postal Service (1993). Kuntz has also been to Tax Court, although not *pro se. See Kuntz v. Commissioner*, 64 T.C.M 1258 (1992).

Further, Kuntz has unsuccessfully petitioned to the United States Supreme Court for writs of certiorari in numerous cases, including *Kuntz v. Fadness*, 519 U.S. 996 (1996); *Kuntz v. Shawmut Bank of Boston*, 501 U.S. 1252 (1991); *Kuntz v. Manley, Burke and Fischer, L.P.A.*, 500 U.S. 918 (1991); *Kuntz v. City of Dayton*, 499 U.S. 962 (1991); *Kuntz v. Society Bank, N.A.*, 498 U.S. 1089 (1991); *Kuntz v. Little Miami Railroad Co.*, 498 U.S. 1027 (1991); *Kuntz v. City of Dayton*, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989); *Kuntz v. Shawmut Bank of Boston*, 488 U.S. 952 (1988); *Kuntz v. Winters National Bank and Trust Co.*, 465 U.S. 1080 (1984).

Commercial Financial, 238 B.R. at 484 n.7.

III. Kuntz's Untimely Notice of Appeal Cannot Serve as a Motion to Extend Time to File a Notice of Appeal

25. Kuntz not only failed to file a timely notice of appeal but also never made a "written motion" pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c) seeking an extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal. Assuming, *arguendo*, that Kuntz intends for his untimely Notice of Appeal to be treated as a motion for an extension of time in which to file a notice under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c), the Notice of Appeal is still insufficient to constitute such a motion.

26. Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c) provides that

A request to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must be made by written motion filed before the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired, except that such a motion filed not later than 20 days after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal may be granted upon a showing of excusable neglect.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(c)(2). The Second Circuit explicitly has ruled that courts may not treat a late-filed notice of appeal as a motion for an extension of time to file such notice. *Campos*, 825 F.2d at 675 (declaring that "there is only one way to obtain an extension of time, and this is to file a motion above and beyond the notice of appeal" and overruling Circuit precedent permitting courts to "treat[] a tardy notice as a 'motion' for extension"); *accord Sellitti v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc.* (*In re R.H. Macy & Co., Inc.*), 173 B.R. 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that, in light of the Second Circuit's decision in *Campos*, "this Court may likewise no longer deem a late-filed notice of appeal to be an application for an extension of time to file that notice of appeal"); *In re Williams*, 216 F.3d at 1298 (refusing to consider *pro se* appellant's late notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time); *In re Dow Corning Corp.*, 255 B.R. at 466 ("The notice of appeal itself is not a request for an extension under Rule 8002 since a request must be made by motion."); *In re Bushnell*, 273 B.R. at 363 ("[T]he law is clear that a notice of appeal filed within

30 days of an appealable order may not be deemed a motion for extension of time in order to avoid the strictures of Rule 8002(c).") (collecting cases); *In re Beiwel*, 2001 WL 753778, at *1-2 (refusing to consider *pro se* appellant's untimely notice of appeal as a timely motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and noting that "[appellant] assumed the risk of overshooting the appeal deadline when he decided to proceed *pro se* without familiarizing himself with the [Bankruptcy] Rules in time to file a timely notice of appeal"). Here, Kuntz did not file a "written motion" requesting an extension of his time for filing a notice of appeal; he simply filed his untimely Notice of Appeal. As such, in accordance with the above well-settled precedent, his Notice of Appeal should be stricken or, alternatively, the Appeal should be dismissed.

- 27. Notwithstanding that courts often liberally construe the submissions of a pro se litigant, see Poole, 368 F.3d at 268, the Notice of Appeal may not be deemed a "motion" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c). Although the Second Circuit has stated that "[a]ny submission signed by a party that may fairly be read as a request to the district court to exercise its discretionary powers to permit a late appeal should suffice" as a motion, Campos, 825 F.2d at 676, such is not the case with a notice of appeal.
- 28. Most recently in *Loral*, Judge Drain considered whether an untimely notice of appeal could be treated, in the case of a *pro se* litigant, as a request for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. *See* Tr. of June 16, 2009 Hr'g at 12:17 22, case no. 03-41710 (RDD). Judge Drain found that the "Second Circuit has made it clear that a party's filing of a late notice of appeal, even when the party is *pro se* and provides affording evidence of excusable neglect, cannot be treated as an application to extend the time to file a notice of appeal." *Id.* at 12:22 13:3 (citations omitted).

29. As set forth above, the law in the Second Circuit and elsewhere is clear that an untimely notice of appeal simply cannot be construed as a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c), even if filed by a *pro se* litigant. Thus, the Appeal should be stricken or, in the alternative, dismissed as Kuntz untimely filed the Notice of Appeal and such notice cannot be construed as a motion to extend the time to appeal the Order.

IV. Even If the Notice of Appeal Were Considered a "Motion" Under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c), Kuntz Cannot Show Excusable Neglect

- 30. Even if the Court were somehow to find that the Notice of Appeal was a "motion" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c), Kuntz cannot show "excusable neglect" justifying his untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 8002(c)(2). The burden of demonstrating "excusable neglect" rests on the party seeking the extension. *In re Hilliard*, 36 B.R. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
- Partnership, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of "excusable neglect" in the context of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) and concluded that the decision whether a delay is justified by excusable neglect is "at bottom, an equitable one." 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993); cf. In re Wechsler, 246 B.R. at 492-93 (recognizing that the Pioneer factors "apply with equal force to [a determination under] Rule 8002(c)(2)"). The Supreme Court in Pioneer held that the determination of excusable neglect takes into account "all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission," including "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395; Wechsler, 246 B.R. at 492. Courts generally have recognized that "[t]he four Pioneer factors do not carry equal weight; the excuse given for the late filing must

have the greatest import." Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir. 2000); In re Beiwel, 2001 WL 753778, at *2 (same); but see U.S. Lines, Inc. v. United States (In re McLean Indus., Inc.), 196 B.R. 670, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the "reason for the delay" factor "may be the pivotal factor, depending on the particular circumstances presented") (emphasis in original). Although excusable neglect may justify "late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control," Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388, "inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 'excusable' neglect . . ." Id. at 392; Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1994); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Investors & Lenders, Ltd. v. Field (In re Investors & Lenders, Ltd.), 169 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (collecting cases). Kuntz manifestly cannot make the requisite showing of excusable neglect.

A. The Reason for the Delay, Including Whether It was Within the Reasonable Control of the Movant

32. As stated, this factor is the most significant consideration. *See In re McLean Indus.*, 196 B.R. at 674; *Lowry*, 211 F.3d at 463. Kuntz simply does not have a valid reason for his delay, which was entirely within his control. Moreover, courts have held that "inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute 'excusable' neglect." *Pioneer*, 507 U.S. at 392; *Weinstock*, 16 F.3d at 503; *In re Beiwel*, 2001 WL 753778, at *2-3 (concluding that *pro se* appellant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect where "he had the responsibility to ascertain the deadline for the appeal period," he was "solely in control of the time for filing his notice of appeal and was not mislead or misinformed at any stage," and "[i]t was his duty to inform himself of the appeal deadline").

- 33. *Pro se* appellants are not granted special dispensation from the requirements for filing an appeal or a motion to extend the time to file an appeal. See, *e.g.*, *Campos*, 825 F.2d 674 (citing *Shah v. Hutto*, 722 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc), for principle that filing requirements "[are] to be applied equally to *pro se* litigants and litigants represented by counsel" and adopting this position in accordance with the "en banc majority in *Shah* and the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits").
- 34. Kuntz, by filing the Motion to Extend earlier in these cases, has demonstrated to this Court that he is not ignorant of the ten-day window in which a bankruptcy court order may be appealed. Whether it was through inadvertence, ignorance or mistake, it was Kuntz's sole responsibility to timely file his Notice of Appeal and he failed to do so.

B. The Danger of Prejudice to the Debtor

35. The Debtors continue to be prejudiced by Kuntz's baseless motions, appeals, and objections. The Debtors are consistently forced to waste time, money and other resources to address the frivolous pleadings filed by Kuntz. Indeed, concurrently with the filing of this Motion, the Debtors are filing another motion to strike yet another frivolous and procedurally improper appeal filed by Kuntz.

C. The Length of the Delay and Its Potential Impact on Judicial Proceedings

36. While the length of the delay was not protracted, Kuntz, being fully cognizant of the Court's ruling, had no reason to delay the filing of his Notice of Appeal.

D. Whether the Movant Acted in Good Faith

37. At this point in the chapter 11 cases, it is clear that Kuntz is no longer acting in good faith. Although he is fully aware of the rules and procedures of this Court, Kuntz continually chooses to disregard them.

38. Given the foregoing application of the *Pioneer* factors, even if the Court

were somehow to consider the untimely Notice of Appeal a "motion" under Bankruptcy Rule

8002(c)(2), Kuntz has failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. Accordingly, the Notice of

Appeal should be stricken or, in the alternative, the Appeal must be dismissed.

Notice

39. No trustee has been appointed in these chapter 11 cases. The Debtors

have served notice of this Motion in accordance with the procedures set forth in the amended

order entered on February 13, 2009 governing case management and administrative procedures

for these cases [Docket No. 2837] on (i) the U.S. Trustee; (ii) the attorneys for the Creditors'

Committee; (iii) the Securities and Exchange Commission; (iv) the Internal Revenue Service;

(v) the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; and (vi) Kuntz. The

Debtors submit that no other or further notice need be provided.

40. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made by the

Debtors to this or any other court.

WHEREFORE the Debtors respectfully request that the Court grant the

relief requested herein and such other and further relief as it deems just and proper.

Dated: December 17, 2009

New York, New York

/s/ Shai Y. Waisman

Shai Y. Waisman

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP

767 Fifth Avenue

New York, New York 10153

Telephone: (212) 310-8000

Facsimile: (212) 310-8007

Attorneys for Debtors

and Debtors in Possession

Exhibit A

1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
3	x		
4 5 6	IN RE: LEHMAN BROTHERS DOCKET NO.: CV-08-11273 (JSR) New York, New York February 19, 2009		
7	x		
8	TRANSCRIPT OF CIVIL CAUSE FOR CONFERENCE		
9 10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JED S. RAKOFF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
11	APPEARANCES:		
12 13 14	For the Appellant: WILLIAM KUNTZ, III, Pro Se P.O. Box 1801 Nantucket, MA 02554		
15 16 17 18 19	For the Appellee: RICHARD P. KRASNOW, ESQ. JOHN W. LUCAS, ESQ. Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10153		
20 21 22	Audio Operator: No Audio Operator Proceedings Recorded by Electronic Sound Recording Transcript Produced by Transcription Service		
23 24 25 26 27	KRISTIN M RUSIN 217 Pine Meadows Circle Hickory NC 28601 kmrusin@earthlink.net		

```
THE CLERK: February 19, 2009, In re: Lehman
1
   Brothers.
             Counsel, please state your name for the record.
3
             MR. KUNTZ: William Kuntz the third.
4
             MR. KRASNOW: Your Honor, Richard Krasnow, Weil
5
   Gotshal & Manges, on behalf of the appellee, Lehman Brothers.
6
7
             MR. LUCAS: John Lucas, on behalf of Lehman Brothers,
   also Weil Gotshal & Manges.
8
9
             THE COURT: Good morning. All right.
             So this is an appeal from the decision of the
10
   bankruptcy court.
11
             Mr. Kuntz, when do you want to file your brief?
12
             MR. KUNTZ: Whenever your Court -- Your Honor would
13
   care to set a date.
14
             THE COURT: Well, the earlier the better, from my
15
   standpoint.
16
17
             MR. KUNTZ: The earlier the better. Two weeks, three
   weeks, a month?
18
             THE COURT: Well, since you're giving me the choice,
19
20
   I'll take two weeks.
21
             MR. KUNTZ: That's fine, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: Yeah.
22
23
             MR. KRASNOW: Your Honor, in reviewing the file last
24
   night in preparation for today's hearing, I came across a
25 pleading which would suggest that the appeal is premature and
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that, in fact, the notice of appeal is, under the rules,
   ineffective.
             And I say that, Your Honor, because the order that
3
   Mr. Kuntz has appealed from was entered on October 16th.
   appears that on October 22, within the ten-day period that I'm
5
   about to refer to, Mr. Kuntz filed with the bankruptcy court a
6
   motion which he's filed, a motion under Rule 60, in which he
7
   sought, presumably, reconsideration of the bankruptcy court's
8
9
   order.
             Your Honor, pursuant to Rule 8010(b) of the Rules of
10
   Bankruptcy Procedure -- that governs --
11
             THE COURT: He's a pro se plaintiff. He can't be
12
13
   expected to have that kind of knowledge.
14
             MR. KRASNOW: Well, --
             THE COURT: Unless you think it's jurisdictional, --
15
             MR. KRASNOW: It is jurisdictional.
16
             THE COURT: Why is it jurisdictional?
17
             MR. KRASNOW: Because --
18
             THE COURT: Did he label it a motion for
19
20
   reconsideration?
21
             MR. KRASNOW: He labeled it as a Rule 60, Your Honor,
   and I will get to --
22
23
             THE COURT: Let me see it.
24
             MR. KRASNOW: Your Honor, may I --
25
             THE COURT: No, not the rule, his motion that you're
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referring to. 2 MR. KRASNOW: May I approach? THE COURT: Please. Just hand it to my courtroom 3 deputy. 4 MR. KRASNOW: Your Honor, what I've handed to the 5 Court is the appellate designation of record that Mr. Kuntz 6 filed with the bankruptcy court. And --7 THE COURT: Excuse me. 8 9 MR. KRASNOW: Sorry, Your Honor. (Pause in proceeding) 10 THE COURT: All right. So it is clear, now that I've 11 had a chance to look at this, that Mr. Kuntz filed this motion 12 asking -- his specific application is that the court amend the 13 order that he's now appealing from to remove the with prejudice 14 determination, which, of course, would be a material issue. 15 And then he also suggests, somewhat gratuitously, that the 16 debtor do this or that. That's not something appropriately 17 addressed to the bankruptcy court. But the first part is. 18 So has that motion been acted on or not? 19 20 MR. KRASNOW: No, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. So I lack jurisdiction, you're right. 22 23 So, Mr. Kuntz, you're going to have to go back and either ask the bankruptcy court to rule promptly on your motion 24 to amend, or perhaps you'll want to withdraw it. I don't know.

That's something you'll have to take up with the bankruptcy court. I can't take jurisdiction of this because there's a pending motion to amend the order, and, putting it in non-legal terms, how can I review something until I know whether the judge is going to grant your motion to make it without prejudice or not? It makes a big difference, which is presumably why you filed your motion.

So I'm sorry that this was not brought to my attention sooner, but this appeal will be now dismissed without prejudice with leave to reply when that motion is resolved or withdrawn, as the case may be.

All right, very good. Thanks so much.

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* * * * *

Exhibit B

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT				
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK				
Case No. 08-13555(JMP)				
Case No. 08-01420(JMP)(SIPA)				
Adv. Case No. 09-01258				
Adv. Case No. 08-01743				
Adv. Case No. 09-01242				
Case No. 09-14884-jmp				
x				
In the Matter of:				
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,				
Debtors.				
x				
In the Matter of:				
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC.,				
Debtor.				
x				
NEUBERGER BERMAN, LLC,				
Plaintiff,				
Plaintiff, -against-				
-against-				
-against- PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,				
-against- PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, LEHMAN BROTHERS INC., AND LEHMAN				

		2		
1				
2	STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,			
3	Plaintiff,			
4	LEHMAN COMMERCIAL PAPER INC.,			
5	-against-			
6	Defendant.			
7	x			
8	LEHMAN BROTHERS SPECIAL FINANCING INC.,			
9	Plaintiff,			
10	BNY CORPORATE TRUSTEE SERVICES, LTD.,			
11	-against-			
12	Defendant.			
13	x			
14	In the Matter of:			
15	LEHMAN RE LTD.,			
16	Debtor.			
17	x			
18	U.S. Bankruptcy Court			
19	One Bowling Green			
20	New York, New York			
21	September 15, 2009			
22	10:03 a.m.			
23	BEFORE:			
24	HON. JAMES M. PECK			
25	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE			

1

2 RE: CASE NOS. 08-13555(JMP) and 08-01420(JMP)(SIPA)

3 HEARING re Interim Applications for Allowance of Compensation

4 for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of

5 Actual and Necessary Expenses [Docket No. 4839]

6

7 | HEARING re Motion of Wells Fargo, NA for Relief from the

8 Automatic Stay [Docket No. 4640]

9

10 HEARING re Motion of Wells Fargo, NA for Relief from the

11 Automatic Stay [Docket No. 4671]

12

HEARING re Motion of Washington Mutual Bank f/k/a Washington

14 Mutual Bank, FA. For Relief from the Automatic Stay [Docket No.

15 4759]

16

17 | HEARING re Motion of A/P Hotel, LLC for Relief from the

18 Automatic Stay [Docket No. 4950]

19

20 | HEARING re Motion for Authorization to Assume an Interest Rate

21 Swap with MEG Energy Corp. [Docket No. 5012]

22

23

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HEARING re Debtors' Motion for Establishment of Procedures for
the Debtors to Transfer Their Interests in Respect of
Residential and Commercial Loans Subject to Foreclosure to
Wholly-Owned Non-Debtor Subsidiaries [Docket No. 4966]

HEARING re Debtors' Motion for Establishment of Procedures for the Debtors to Compromise Claims of the Debtors in Respect of Real Estate Loans [Docket No. 4942]

HEARING re Motion of Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank for 2004 Examination [Docket No. 4800]

HEARING re Debtors' Motion for Authorization to Implement

Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures for Affirmative

Claims of Debtors Under Derivative Contracts [Docket No. 4453]

2.0

HEARING re Debtors' Motion to Compel Performance of Metavante

Corporation's Obligations Under an Executory Contract and to

Enforce the Automatic Stay [Docket No. 3691]

2.4

HEARING re Motion of DnB Nor Bank ASA for Allowance and Payment of Administrative Expense Claim and Allowing Setoff of Such Claim [Docket No. 4054]

Pnina Eilberg

25

today the determination made last October to deny Mr. Kuntz's request for relief from the automatic stay.

The nature of Mr. Kuntz's claim as against the Lehman estate remains obscure to me, even as a result of the representations made concerning a possible constructive trust over assets that belong to the estate of another debtor, Grand Union Company. As I said previously, I know nothing about that case. I had no involvement in that case. I have not studied the docket or decisions from that case. I'm simply dealing with the case which is before me, which is the Lehman Brothers case.

It's apparent that Mr. Kuntz, based upon the papers filed, has not stated good cause for relief from the earlier order denying his motion for relief from the automatic stay. As a result that order stands, and from a procedural perspective this means that the 60(b) motion, having been resolved, is not longer pending in this court, which presumably means that to the extent there is an appealable right, and I'm not saying that there is one, that Mr. Kuntz can exercise to go back to the district court, the fact that there is a pending 60(b) motion no longer is an impediment to such procedure. Whether or not it is available, however, given the passage of time, is something that I don't comment on, nor am I asking anyone else to comment on.

MR. KRASNOW: Thank you, Your Honor. I believe we

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Exhibit C

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	- x
In re:	: Chapter 11
LORAL SPACE & COMMUNICATIONS LTD., ET AL.,	: Lead Case No. 03-41710 (RDD) : 03-41709 (RDD) through : 03-41728 (RDD)
Reorganized Debtors.	: Jointly Administered
PHIL IVALDY,	:
Appellant, v.	; ; ;
LORAL SPACE & COMMUNICATIONS LTD., ET AL.,	: : :
Reorganized Debtors-Appellees.	· :

ORDER DISMISSING PHIL IVALDY'S APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR FINAL DECREE AND CLOSING OF THIS CHAPTER 11 CASE

Upon the Motion dated May 18, 2009 (the "Motion"), of Loral Space & Communications Ltd. and its affiliated reorganized debtors (collectively, the "Debtors" and, as reorganized, the "Reorganized Debtors") to (I) Enforce the Order Confirming the Debtors' Fourth Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, as Modified, (II) Dismiss Phil Ivaldy's Appeal of Order Granting Application for Final Decree and Closing of this Chapter 11 Case and, in the Alternative, (III) Strike Certain Items from Phil Ivaldy's Designation of Record on Appeal; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Standing Order M-61 Referring to Bankruptcy Judges for the Southern District of New York Any and All Proceedings Under Title 11, dated July 10, 1984 (Ward, Acting, C.J.); and consideration of the Motion and the relief

requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); and venue being proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and due and proper notice of the Motion having been provided to (i) Phil Ivaldy, (ii) the United States Trustee for the Southern District of New York, (iii) the attorneys for the agent for the Debtors' prepetition secured lenders, (iv) the attorneys for the statutory committee of unsecured creditors appointed in these chapter 11 cases, (v) the attorneys for the official committee of equity security holders appointed in these chapter 11 cases and (vi) those parties entitled to notice pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 15, 2003 establishing notice procedures in these chapter 11 cases; and it appearing that no other or further notice need be provided; and the Court having conducted a hearing (the "Hearing") on the Motion on June 16, 2009; and based upon the record of the Hearing; and upon (i) the Motion, (ii) the Reorganized Debtors-Appellees' Counter-Designation of Items to be Included in Record on Appeal (the "Counter-Designation"); (iii) Appellant's Objections to the Reorganized Debtor-Appellees' Motion (the "Objection"), (iv) the Reply of the Reorganized Debtors to the Objection, (v) Appellant's Motion for Extension of Time to File Responses to the Reorganized Debtors-Appellees' Counter-Designation and Motion, and (vi) Appellant's Opposition to Application of Section 350(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3022 for Final Decree Closing Chapter 11 Case of Loral Space & Communications Ltd.; and the Court having determined that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion and at the Hearing establish just cause for the relief granted herein; and upon all of the proceedings had before the Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefore for the reasons stated by the Court at the conclusion of the Hearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, **DETERMINES AND CONCLUDES THAT:**

- A. The Appeal was filed after the expiration of the period set forth in Rule 8002(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Bankruptcy Rules").
- B. Phil Ivaldy did not make any request to enlarge the period set forth in the Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c).
- C. Phil Ivaldy neither claimed nor offered any facts to support any claim of excusable neglect with respect to the filing of the Appeal.

FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING AND AFTER DUE DELIBERATION THE COURT

ORDERS THAT:

- 1. The Motion is hereby granted as provided herein.
- 2. The Appeal is dismissed, with prejudice.
- 3. The requirement under Rule 9013-1(b) of the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the Southern District of New York for the filing of a memorandum of law hereby is waived.

Dated: June 18, 2009

New York, New York

/s/Robert D. Drain
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

One Bowling Green New York, NY 10004–1408

IN RE: Loral Space & Communications Ltd. and Space Systems/Loral, Inc. ("SS/L") CASE NO.: 03-41710-rdd

Social Security/Taxpayer ID/Employer ID/Other Nos.: CHAPTER: 11

13-3867424

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

An order of dismissal was entered by the Honorable Robert D. Drain in this Chapter 11 case.

Loral Space & Communications Ltd. was dismissed from the case on June 18, 2009 WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated: June 18, 2009 Vito Genna

Clerk of the Court

Notice Recipients

District/Off: 0208-1 User: mgist Date Created: 6/18/2009

Case: 03-41710-rdd Form ID: 131 Total: 97

Recipients submitted to the BNC (Bankruptcy Noticing Center) without an address:

Space Systems/Loral, Inc. ("SS/L") dbpos

3932096 AMB Property, L.P.

TOTAL: 2

Recipients of Notice of Electronic Filing:

Alan Jay Lipkin alipkin@willkie.com, maosbny@willkie.com

lori.fife@weil.com, garrett.fail@weil.com, jae.kim@weil.com, saima.majid@weil.com Lori R. Fife aty Shai Waisman shai.waisman@weil.com, amanda.hendy@weil.com, rachel.albanese@weil.com, aty jae.kim@weil.com, ilusion.rodriguez@weil.com, sherri.toub@weil.com, victoria.vron@weil.com,

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lacey.laken@weil.com

Tonny K. Ho maosbny@willkie.com, tho@willkie.com aty

TOTAL: 5

Recipients submitted to the BNC (Bankruptcy Noticing Center):						
db	Loral Space & Communications Ltd. c/o Loral SpaceCom Corporation 600 Third Avenue New York,					
ust	United States Trustee 33 Whitehall Street 21st Floor New York, NY 10004					
aty	United States Trustee Alicia M. Leonhard Street, Suite 2100 Pamela Jean Lustrin					
aty	Pamela Jean Lustrin United States Trustee 33 Whitehall Street 21st Floor New York, NY 10004					
aty	Theodore Elias Tsekerides Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP 767 5th Avenue New York, NY 10153					
smg	New York State Tax Commission Bankruptcy/Special Procedures Section P.O. Box 5300 Albany, NY 12205–0300					
smg	United States Attorney One St. Andrew's Plaza Claims Unit – Room 417 New York, NY 10007–1701					
smg	Internal Revenue Service 290 Broadway Insolvency 5th fl New York, NY 10007 N.Y. State Unemployment Insurance Fund P.O. Box 551 Albany, NY 12201–0551					
smg	N.Y. State Unemployment Insurance Fund P.O. Box 551 Albany, NY 12201–0551					
smg	New York City Dept. Of Finance 345 Adams Street, 3rd Floor Attn: Legal Affairs – Devora Cohn Brooklyn, NY 11201–3719					
3233496	AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &FELD LLP 590 Madison Avenue New York, New York					
3233540	10022 Attn.: Daniel H. Golden, Esq. David H. Botter, Esq. AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &FELD LLP 590 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10022 Attn.: Daniel H. Golden, Esq. David H. Botter, Esq.					
3239439	10022 Attn.: Daniel H. Golden, Esq. David H. Botter, Esq. ALAN W POPE STEPHEN E. GRUENDEL MOORE &VAN ALLEN PLLC 100 NORTH TRYON STREET, SUITE 4700 CHARLOTTE, NC 28200–4003					
3238810	ALLEN PETERS, ESQ. NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION 1840 CENTURY PART EAST LOS ANGELES, CA 90067					
3311349	AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED SVCS CO INC CORP CARD C/o BECKET &LEE					
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TOTAL: 90

Exhibit D

516-608-2400

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Case No. 03-41710

In the Matter of:

LORAL SPACE & COMMUNICATIONS LTD., ET AL.,

Debtors.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court

One Bowling Green

New York, New York

June 16, 2009

12:42 p.m.

B E F O R E:

HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN

U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

212-267-6868

MOTION of Reorganized Debtors to (I) Enforce the Order Confirming the Debtors Fourth Amended Join Plan, (II) Dismiss Phil Ivaldy's Appeal of Order Granting Application for Final Decree and Closing of this Chapter 11 Case. Transcribed By: Esther Accardi

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      BY: SHAI Y. WAISMAN, ESQ.
 8
 9
10
      PHIL IVALDY
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     Appearing Pro Se
12
      (Telephonically)
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Loral. 3 MR. WAISMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 4 MR. WAISMAN: Shai Waisman, Weil Gotshal & Manges on 5 behalf of the reorganized Loral debtors. 6 Your Honor, we're here on the debtors' motion to 7 enforce the confirmation order, dismiss an appeal, or in the 8 alternative, to strike designation of record. 9 This relates to the notice of appeal served and filed 10 11 by Mr. Ivaldy. I'm not sure if Mr. Ivaldy is present or 12 participating on the phone. 13 THE COURT: Are you on the phone, Mr. Ivaldy? MR. IVALDY: I'm here. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. WAISMAN: Your Honor, unfortunately, the Court is 16 probably all too familiar with the background of this matter. 17 I won't belabor the record as it's been a long morning. 18 In summary, Mr. Ivaldy -- Your Honor issued a final 19 decree closing the lead case in this matter on April 15, 2009. 2.0 21 And that order was entered on the docket of the cases on April 15, 2009. 22 Mr. Ivaldy did not file his notice of appeal until 23 thirteen days later, April 28, 2009. Manifestly, he has not 24

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212-267-6868 516-608-2400

complied with Bankruptcy Rule 8002. The appeal is late and the

Bankruptcy Court retains the jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for being untimely.

In the alternative, Your Honor, if one were to read the notice of appeal and the subsequent responses filed by Mr. Ivaldy, they make clear they have nothing to do, whatsoever, with Your Honor's order entering a final decree in these cases. Rather, Mr. Ivaldy would like to reargue or collaterally attack Your Honor's confirmation order which is now years old. And which Mr. Ivaldy objected to in the original proceeding lost, took an appeal from that to the District Court as well as the Second Circuit. Denied by both courts and petitioned to be heard by the Supreme Court, and that, too, was denied.

As such, the confirmation order is final, nonappealable and the collateral attack is, in fact, a violation
of the final confirmation order, itself. And Your Honor should
enforce the confirmation order and dismiss the appeal on those
grounds.

Finally, if Your Honor were to entertain or otherwise believe that the appeal were timely, for the reasons stated in our papers, and I don't have to go on, we would ask that the designation of the record be stricken as requested, as none of the documents Mr. Ivaldy seeks to rely on in his appeal, were submitted in connection with Your Honor's consideration of the final decree, and, therefore, do not constitute part of the record.

2.0

Unless Your Honor has any questions, those are the 1 2 simple facts before the Court. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 (Pause) THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ivaldy, do you have 5 anything beyond what you submitted? 6 MR. IVALDY: I'd like to go through item-by-item. 7 One of the statements that had just been made, I guess 8 the first issue would be whether or not my appeal is timely. 9 Does the Court have any problems with my appeal? 10 THE COURT: Yes. I believe it is -- based on what I 11 see as to the facts, the appeal is untimely. 12 MR. IVALDY: I worked with the Court and submitted the 13 appeal. Was informed that the appeal was submitted in a timely 14 fashion. And the Clerk had not docketed the appeal as he 15 received it. 16 THE COURT: Where is that set forth? 17 MR. IVALDY: I'm sorry; I cannot hear you very well. 18 19 THE COURT: I don't -- where is that set forth? I can 2.0 tell you it's very unusual for anyone in our Clerk's office to 21 give anyone a statement that something is timely or not. MR. IVALDY: When did you file your order? 22 23 THE COURT: The order, itself, was entered April 15th. MR. IVALDY: That's correct. And then I have ten days 24

to respond, is that correct?

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THE COURT: Well, in fact, you had more than ten days, 1 2 because April 25th was a Saturday. 3 MR. IVALDY: Okay. So you would receive it on the 4 following Monday then. THE COURT: The 28th. I'm sorry, the 27th. 5 MR. IVALDY: Yes, the 27th, is that correct? 6 THE COURT: That would have been timely. But our 7 records show that it was actually docketed on the 28th. 8 MR. IVALDY: Yes. But the clerk had received it in a 9 timely fashion and notified me of that. 10 11 THE COURT: Do you have any record of that? 12 MR. IVALDY: Do you want me to pull out my records from Express Mail showing that you received it in a timely 13 fashion? Are we going to play the same game that the District 14 Court played with me? 15 THE COURT: Well, it's not a game, sir, this is 16 important. 17 MR. IVALDY: I perceive it as a game. 18 THE COURT: All right. Why don't we move to the next 19 2.0 point then? 21 MR. IVALDY: If you want me to I will get my records showing that the papers were filed in a timely manner. And as 22 23 far as I'm concerned, Weil Gotshal is playing a game with me. They have the papers; they received the papers the same day as 2.4

you did.

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If Weil Gotshal is willing to submit an affidavit that 1 2 they did not receive it in a timely fashion then let them do 3 it. But as far as I'm concerned, without that affidavit this is a non-issue. 4 THE COURT: Well, no, that's not really right. It was 5 filed on the 28th. 6 MR. IVALDY: I don't care when it was filed --7 THE COURT: Well, I do. That's the date that sets the 8 timeline unless something extraordinary shows that it was 9 received and should have been filed at an earlier date. And I 10 11 have no evidence of that fact. Do you have an affidavit of service or filing? 12 MR. IVALDY: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Where is that? 14 MR. IVALDY: I beg your pardon? 15 THE COURT: Where is it? 16 MR. IVALDY: I have it. 17 THE COURT: Did you file it? 18 MR. IVALDY: I have from the Clerk that my papers were 19 2.0 filed on time. 21 THE COURT: No, no. Did you file it with the Court, the affidavit of service? 22 MR. IVALDY: Yes. Along with the papers. 23 MR. WAISMAN: Your Honor, with Mr. Ivaldy's notice of 24 25 appeal, there appears a certificate of service signed by Mr.

VERITEXT REPORTING COMPANY

Ivaldy indicating that he sent, by U.S. Mail on April 24th, his notice of appeal to Your Honor's chambers, our offices, the Solicitor General of the United States, and the United States Attorney General.

Irrespective of that, the docket clearly indicates the appeal was not filed until the 28th. And notwithstanding Mr. Ivaldy's pro se appearance in these cases, he is very familiar with the rules of procedure, has filed over a hundred pleadings, and has repeatedly appeared before this Court. as he indicates, the District Court, as well. And has been repeatedly admonished that the rules aren't a game and they need to be complied with.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. IVALDY: I think we should ask Weil Gotshal the date that they received my notice.

THE COURT: No, that's not the relevant issue. The issue is when it was received by the Clerk of the Court.

MR. IVALDY: It was the Clerk of the Court received it the same day that Weil Gotshal did.

2.0 THE COURT: All right. Did you have anything else on 21 this?

22 MR. IVALDY: Are you speaking to me?

THE COURT: Yes. 23

MR. IVALDY: Not on this issue. 24

25 Anything else? THE COURT: Okay.

516-608-2400

MR. IVALDY: I think that Weil Gotshal should be able 1 2 to make a statement on the date that they received it. 3 THE COURT: I already told you that's not relevant. MR. IVALDY: Well, the date --4 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have anything else, Mr. 5 Ivaldy? 6 MR. IVALDY: On this issue, no. 7 THE COURT: Okay. On anything else? 8 MR. IVALDY: Well, of course. I mean, I was given an 9 agenda that had gotten to me today. But I never had it before. 10 11 And there's a service list that was sent by Federal Express. Federal Express didn't give it to me on time for this hearing, 12 number one. 13 And the affidavit previously by Donald Agean on his 14 affidavit of service -- from my perception, his affidavit of 15 service was late. So I don't understand what the --16 THE COURT: But --17 MR. IVALDY: I think that what you have to do -- what 18 19 I urge the Court to do is have a five-minute recess and you 2.0 check with the Clerk and see when they got this notice of 21 appeal. I think that that would be the easiest thing and --THE COURT: All right. Do you have anything else, Mr. 22 23 Ivaldy? MR. IVALDY: I filed my notice of appeal in a timely 24 25 manner.

212-267-6868

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. IVALDY: I see no documentation that it hasn't been done.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. I have before me the debtors' motion to dismiss Mr. Phil Ivaldy's appeal. My order dated April 15, 2009 closing the debtors' chapter 11 case.

The debtor seeks various alternative forms of relief in its motion. But the first form of relief it seeks is really a gatekeeping item. The debtor contends that Mr. Ivaldy's appeal was untimely and, therefore, that it should be dismissed.

MR. IVALDY: They have not given any proof of that.

THE COURT: I'm giving my ruling, sir; I'm not in oral argument at this point.

MR. IVALDY: Okay.

THE COURT: As far as the motion is concerned, there are three issues as I see it.

First, is the issue as to whether this is an issue that the Bankruptcy Court should address or whether it's an issue properly addressed by the District Court to which the appeal was directed. Generally speaking, the filing of a notice of appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction over matters covered by the appeal. However, the timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory in jurisdiction. If the notice is not timely filed, the Appellate Court is without

jurisdiction to hear the appeal. That's a quote from In re Williams, 216 F.3d, 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000).

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More specifically, this issue has been addressed by, at least, one court directly. Where the court found that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to consider the timeliness of the notice of appeal as this ruling said. The notice of appeal from the final order generally deprives a lower court over jurisdiction over the merits of the matter subject to appeal. However, the Bankruptcy Court retains certain authority concerning the timeliness of the appeal. Including, for example, the authority to extend the period of time for filing a notice of appeal, pursuant to Rule 8002(c)

In any event -- and I'm sorry, that's in In re Geiger, 2006 U.S. District LEXIS 39570, pages 2-3 (W.D. Wisconsin June 12, 2006). So I believe that it is appropriate for me to decide this issue.

Secondly, there's an issue, given the fact that Mr.

Ivaldy is pro se, as to whether I should view an untimely notice of appeal as treated for him as a request for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal, which would, if I would do that, at the time, given the time he filed it, be liberally granted. However, the Second Circuit has made it clear that a party's filing of a late notice of appeal, even when the party is pro se and provides affording evidence of excusable neglect, cannot be treated as an application to

extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Campos v. LeFevre, 825 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1987). See also In re R.H. Macy and Company, 173 B.R. 301 at 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

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Finally, there's the underlying issue whether the appeal was, indeed, untimely. The certificate of service indicates that the appeal was filed on April 24th -- I'm sorry, it was mailed on April 24, 2009, which would have fallen within the proper timely period for an appeal from the April 15, 2009 order. However, mailing does not start the -- or count as far as the time to appeal is concerned. The time of filing of the notice is measured not from mailing but from actual receipt by the Bankruptcy Clerk. In re Geiger, again, 2006 U.S. District LEXIS 39570 at pages 3-4, citing In re Maurice, 69 F.3d 830-832 (7th Cir. 1995), as well as Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a).

Here, the appeal is not shown as having been filed until April 28, which was a day after the expiration of the time --

MR. IVALDY: You have --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Of the time to appeal. And that evidence of filing, without any evidence to the contrary other than Mr. Ivaldy's statement over the phone at this hearing, that he believes it was received before the 28th, to my mind is sufficient to establish the untimeliness of the appeal.

So for those reasons, in the absence of any proof to

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1	the contrary, I will treat the filing date as the receipt date
2	and find that the appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.
3	In light of that, I don't believe that it would be
4	appropriate to address the other forms of relief sought in the
5	motion.
6	MR. WAISMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Would Your Honor
7	like us to settle an order?
8	THE COURT: Just submit the order.
9	MR. WAISMAN: Thank you, Your Honor, we will.
10	MR. IVALDY: What are you going to do if you find out
11	later that it was received on time?
12	THE COURT: I am not going to check, that's not what
13	judges do.
14	MR. IVALDY: But what are you going to do if I
15	submit if I get the Court to
16	THE COURT: I will have to decide that if and when you
17	make such a motion.
18	All right.
19	MR. WAISMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Thank you.
21	(Proceedings concluded at 1:03 p.m.)
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VERITEXT REPORTING COMPANY

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In re : Chapter 11 Case No.

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et al., : 08-13555 (JMP)

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Debtors. : (Jointly Administered)

-----X

ORDER STRIKING FROM THE RECORD WILLIAM KUNTZ'S NOTICE OF APPEAL OF THE ORDER DENYING RELIEF UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b)

Upon the Motion dated December 16, 2009 (the "Motion"), of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ("LBHI") and its affiliated debtors in the above-referenced chapter 11 cases, as debtors in possession (together, the "Debtors"), to strike from the record of these cases William Kuntz, III's ("Kuntz") notice of appeal (the "Notice of Appeal") from an order of this Court, entered on September 17, 2009, denying Kuntz's motion to modify or vacate the Court's earlier order denying Kuntz's motion for relief from the automatic stay (the "Order") [Docket No. 5215] or, in the alternative, dismissing Kuntz's appeal of the Order; and the Court having jurisdiction to consider the Motion and the relief requested therein in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the Standing Order M-61 Referring to Bankruptcy Judges for the Southern District of New York Any and All Proceedings Under Title 11, dated July 10, 1984 (Ward, Acting C.J.); and consideration of the Motion and the relief requested therein being a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §157(b); and venue being proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409; and due and proper notice having been provided in accordance with the procedures set forth in the amended order entered February 13, 2009 governing case management and administrative procedures [Docket No. 2837] to (i) the U.S.

Trustee; (ii) the attorneys for the Creditors' Committee; (iii) the Securities and Exchange

Commission; (iv) the Internal Revenue Service; (v) the United States Attorney for the

Southern District of New York; and (vi) Kuntz, and it appearing that no other or further

notice need be provided; and a hearing having been held to consider the relief requested

in the Motion (the "Hearing"); and the Court having found and determined that the relief

sought in the Motion is in the best interests of the Debtors, their estates and creditors, and

all parties in interest and that the legal and factual bases set forth in the Motion establish

just cause for the relief granted herein; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause

appearing therefore,

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, DETERMINES AND CONCLUDES THAT:

A. Kuntz's Notice of Appeal was filed after the expiration of the period set forth in Rule 8002(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the

"Bankruptcy Rules").

B. Kuntz did not make any request to enlarge the period set forth in the

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c).

C. Kuntz did not claim nor offer any facts to support any claim of excusable

neglect with respect to the untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal.

FOR ALL OF THE FOREGOING AND AFTER DUE DELIBERATION THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Motion is hereby granted.

2. The Notice of Appeal is stricken from the record of these cases.

Dated: January ___, 2010

New York, New York

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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